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THE LEGALITY OF THE ROZELLE RULE AND
RELATED PRACTICES IN THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE
I. Introduction
Traditional rules designed to control player movement within the
National Football League (NFL)' have recently been challenged in
two federal district courts. In Kapp v. NFL' Judge Sweigert con-
cluded that these rules constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.'
In Mackey v. NFL4 Judge Larson held that the Rozelle Rule5 is in
violation of the antitrust laws.'
The system of player control in the NFL begins with a draft of
college seniors held annually by the 28 member clubs.7 Once a team
selects a player in the draft and places him on its reserve list, that
team has the exclusive right to negotiate for his services.' A team
which attempts to negotiate with a player reserved by another team
is subject to severe disciplinary action, known as the Tampering
Rule.' A prospective player must sign the Standard Player Con-
tract,'" one clause of which binds him to the NFL Constitution and
1. The National Football League (NFL) is an unincorporated association of football clubs.
There are currently 28 teams, each operating in the United States. The NFL schedules and
organizes the games played between the teams, providing the officials and formulating the
rules. Pete Rozelle, after whom the Rozelle Rule is named, is an employee of the NFL., and
its chief executive officer and Commissioner. Mackey v. NFL, No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 1 (D.
Minn. Dec. 30, 1975). At the time Mackey was decided the NFL had 26 teams but has since
expanded to 28.
2. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
3. Id. at 82.
4. No. 4-72-Civil 277 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 1975).
5. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAws art. XII, § 12.1(H). For a discussion of this rule, see text
accompanying notes 14-15 infra.
6. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 9.
7. NFL CONST. AND BY-LAWS art XIV, § 14.3(A) [hereinafter cited as Draft Rule]. The
current rules provide for a draft by the 26 member clubs, but the league has expanded and
now has 28. The draft is conducted in the following way:
Each club picks one player in each round. Selection is made in the reverse order of
the final standings the year before. The team with the worst won-lost record the
previous year selects first, the team with the best record picks last, and so on.
Id.
8. Id. art. XIV, § 14.5.
9. Id. art. IX, § 9.2 [hereinafter cited as Tampering Rule].
10. Id. art. XV, § 15.6(a) [hereinafter cited as Standard Player Contract Rule].
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By-Laws." This contract also contains an option clause which gives
the employing team the right to renew a player's contract for one
year beyond the time stipulated in the contract, at a compensation
rate of 90% of the expired contract. 2 Once this option year is over,
the player is then a free agent; free to sign a contract with any team
in the league.'3 The NFL Constitution and By-Laws provide that a
team which signs a player who has become a free agent in this way
must compensate the former employing team." If the two teams are
unable to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on compensa-
tion, the League Commissioner has the right, in his sole discretion,
to fix the rate of compensation."' The rule requiring compensation
and giving the Commissioner the power to fix compensation is the
Rozelle Rule.
In Kapp, plaintiff signed a two year contract with the Minnesota
Vikings in 1967. He played for that team during the 1967 and 1968
seasons, and in 1969 he played without a contract, as the Vikings
invoked the option clause. Plaintiff refused to sign a contract in 1970
and the New England Patriots, agreeing to compensate the Vikings
in satisfaction of the Rozelle Rule, contracted with Kapp for the
1970 season and the following two years. Kapp did not sign the
Standard Player Contract. He played in 1970, but when he refused
to sign the Standard Player Contract in 1971 he was told to leave
the team at the summer training camp prior to the start of that
season. 6
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that enforcement of these rules
constituted a combination among the clubs in the NFL to refuse to
deal with players except under the above stated conditions. He
claimed that in effect this was a boycott or blacklist and as such a
11. "The Player agrees at all times to comply with and be bound by: the Constitution
and By-Laws .... " National Football League Standard Players Contracts § 4.
12. Id. § 10. This section states:
The Club may, by sending notice in writing to the Player, on or before the first day of
May following the football season . . . renew this contract for a further term of one
(1) year on the same terms as are provided by this contract, except that (1) the Club
may fix the rate of compensation to be paid by the Club to the Player during said
further term, which rate of compensation shall not be less than ninety percent (90%)




16. 390 F. Supp. at 76-78.
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per se violation of the Sherman Act. He further contended that even
if the challenged rules were not a per se violation, they were illegal
under the rule of reason, because they go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to achieve the business goals involved. He claimed that
enforcement of these rules drove him out of professional football,
and sought damages for this injury. 7
Mackey was an action brought by present and former professional
football players in the NFL. The complaint consisted of two counts,
both of which alleged the illegality of the Rozelle Rule as a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, or in the alternative, as illegal under
the rule of reason. In Count I plaintiffs sought an injunction against
enforcement of the Rozelle Rule. In Count II they sought damages
sustained as a result of previous enforcement of the Rozelle Rule. 8
In both cases, the NFL based its defense on two major issues. The
first involved the standard to be used in determining the legality of
the challenged rules.
II. Per Se v. Rule of Reason
Unlike baseball which has received an exemption from the Su-
preme Court, 9 football was held subject to the antitrust laws in
Radovich v. NFL.2" Plaintiffs in Kapp" and Mackey" claimed that
the challenged rules were per se violations of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.23
The per se doctrine in antitrust law was explained by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 4 The Court
noted that price-fixing agreements are prohibited by the Sherman
17. Id. at 79.
18. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 1-2.
19. Flood v. Kuh'n, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953).
20. 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
21. 390 F. Supp. at 75.
22. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 2.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) states that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . ..
24. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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Act because of their unavoidable effects, and they are illegal regard-
less of whether the prices agreed to are reasonable. 5
Other categories of agreements have also been found to cause
prohibited injuries to competition. Once it is established that an
agreement falls within one of these categories, it automatically
comes within the prohibitions of the Act without the necessity of
further inquiry under the rule of reason."6 Where a certain trade
practice has been before the courts on numerous occasions and has
been uniformly condemned, the courts take judicial notice that its
effect is substantially to restrain trade. They infer that the only
intent underlying the practice is to achieve such an anti-competitive
effect.27
The net effect of the challenged NFL practices is analogous to
trade association practices which have been declared illegal in the
past. The draft and the restraints on player movement imposed by
the owners are analogous to trade association action requiring all
members to deal with prospective employees only on uniform terms.
The Supreme Court has found this to be illegal.28 The Option Rule,
the Rozelle Rule, and the Standard Player Contract Rule are ulti-
mately enforceable against uncooperative players by boycott, as
occurred in Kapp.2 This practice has been held to be a per se viola-
tion of the antitrust laws.' "
The defendants in Kapp and Mackey contended that professional
league sports are unique by virtue of the fact that the league mem-
25. Id. at 397.
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of
one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not,
involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices...
Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves
unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether
a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed.
Id.
26. J. BURNS, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 39 (1958).
27. J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 123 (rev. ed. 1966).
28. See Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926);
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); cf. United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) in which the Court found that a division of the
market among buyers was an incidental result of a price fixing scheme and therefore was
illegal. Id. at 223. The player draft in the NFL is, in effect, a division of the market among
buyers.
29. 390 F. Supp. at 81.
30. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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bers are not true competitors.' In other words, although teams com-
pete on the playing field, it is in their mutual interests that all the
teams in the league prosper financially. This analysis has received
recognition in the courts.2 Whether this justifies application of the
rule of reason is an issue on which authority is divided.
In Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores33 the Supreme Court stated:34
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders,
have long been held to be in the forbidden category. They have not been
saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances
This case and Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC35 have been widely
cited as establishing that collective refusals to do business cannot
be justified by any motive or ultimate goal, however reasonable.3
However, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,'3 a case involv-
ing a group boycott, the Court suggested that a boycott may be
removed from the per se category by a "justification derived from
the policy of another statute or otherwise." It has been suggested
that where collective group action is inherent in the structure of the
industry, as in the sports industry, the "or otherwise" justification
is present.3 9 Silver may be distinguishable in that it involved a regu-
lated industry, and the justification was derived from the policy of
the Securities Exchange Act.40
31. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 2; 390 F. Supp. at 79.
32. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc., v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 503-04 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 273-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); United States v. NFL, 116 F.
Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
33. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
34. Id. at 212.
35. 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The court stated "the reasonableness of the methods pursued
by the combination to accomplish its unlawful object is no more material than would be the
reasonableness of the prices fixed by unlawful combination." Id. at 468.
36. See Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 COLUM. L. REV.
843, 863-64 (1959); Comment, "Political" Blacklisting in the Motion Picture Industry: A
Sherman Act Violation, 74 YALE L. J. 567, 570-71 (1965).
37. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
38. Id. at 348-49.
39. Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of
Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1486, 1501 (1966).
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78. But see Cowen v. New York Stock
Exchange, 256 F. Supp. 462, 468 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1967). In Cowen
the court upheld disciplinary rules of the New York Stock Exchange which would ordinarily
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However, whether or not Silver is reliable authority, there are
lower court cases which have reviewed trade association programs
labelled per se in the past and nonetheless applied the rule of rea-
son.4' Thus the broad language of Klor's seems to have received a
narrower application. This is necessitated by the fact that certain
practices are essential for the continued existence of particular in-
dustries. It is illogical to condemn and judicially eliminate practices
within the NFL or any other industry simply because similar prac-
tices within a totally unrelated industry have been condemned. A
rule of law which fails to take into account the possible unique
nature of certain industries is inappropriate.
Application of the rule of reason, on the other hand, provides the
court with the opportunity to examine the challenged practices with
regard to the needs of the particular industry involved."
[E]xclusionary measures designed to enforce schemes of self-regulation
should be permitted when justified by public policy or essential for efficient
operation of an entire industry. Rather than condemning all such activities,
the antitrust laws should assume an affirmative role in controlling and limit-
ing them.
Kapp and Mackey reached different results in the resolution of
this issue. In Kapp, on a motion for summary judgment, the court
concluded that the rule of reason was the appropriate test for deter-
mining the legality of the challenged rules.4" It based its decision on
several factors. It noted the cases recognizing the unique nature and
have been antitrust violations. Unlike the view that Silver is distinguishable because it
involves a statutory justification, the court in Cowen stated that the result would have been
the same even if there were no implied statutory authorization for the challenged rules.
41. Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n., 190 F. Supp. 241
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
42. Note, supra note 39, at 1487. See also United States v. Columbia Pictures, 189 F.
Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), afftd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
Any judicially, as opposed to legislatively, declared per se rule is not conclusively
binding on this court as to any set of facts not basically the same as those in the cases
in which the rule was applied. . . . Therefore, while the per se rule should be followed
in almost all cases, the court must always be conscious of the fact that a case might
arise in which the facts indicate that an injustice would be done by blindly accepting
the per se rule.
Id. at 556.
43. 390 F. Supp. at 81.
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purposes of sports league activities," as well as the history of federal
excecutive and congressional interpretation of the antitrust laws, as
they relate to sports league activities." The court then held that
"league enforcement of most of the challenged rules is so patently
unreasonable that there is no genuine issue for trial.""
In Mackey the court held that "the Rozelle Rule constitutes a per
se violation of the antitrust laws"4 and that "the Rozelle Rule and
its related practices constitute a concerted refusal to deal and a
group boycott on the part of defendants.""
For the reasons previously stated, the decision in Kapp to apply
the rule of reason appears to be the better view. It is to this issue
that this Note now turns.
III. The Reasonableness of the Challenged Rules
In determining the reasonableness of a challenged agreement
among defendants in an antitrust case the court should examine the
purpose of the agreement and its effects. In addition, the court
should determine whether the purpose, if legitimate, can be
achieved by a less anti-competitive alternative. If a less anti-
competitive alternative is available, then the present system is un-
reasonable."
A. Purpose
Teams within a sports league need some means of maintaining
competitive balance on the playing field. This fact has been recog-
44. Id., citing Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
45. 390 F. Supp. at 81. As to Congress the court cited: the enactment of legislation
exempting joint arrangements for club television rights from the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. §§
1291-94 (1970); the sponsorship of a bill by Senator John F. Kennedy in 1958 that would
have provided a substantially unqualified antitrust exemption for the player rules of all
professional sports leagues (citation omitted); and the enactment of legislation authorizing
merger of the American Football League and the National Football League, 15 U.S.C. § 1291
(1970). As to the Executive branch, the court noted a 1961 acknowledgement by the Depart-
ment of Justice that professional leagues need some joint arrangements to assure their contin-
ued existence, and a similar acknowledgement in 1971 (citations omitted).
46. 390 F. Supp. at 82.
47. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 9.
48. Id.
49. This was the approach of the analysis in Mackey on the issue of reasonableness. See
text accompanying notes 61-67 infra. See also Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
1976]
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nized in cases dealing with anti-competitive practices in baseball
and hockey, as well as football. A league which is unable to main-
tain the interest of the fans cannot survive, and it is fair to say that
balanced competition helps to maintain that interest. Accepting the
premise that some method for equalization of players among mem-
ber teams in a sports league is a necessary element of league organi-
zation and that the challenged rules achieve equalization,"' the issue
remains whether the current rules are a reasonable method of
achieving this result.
B. Effects
The Mackey court, even though it found a per se violation, did
not ignore the issue of reasonableness. It held that the Rozelle Rule
when viewed in conjunction with the other anti-competitive prac-
tices of the league (the Draft, the Standard Player Contract, the
Option Clause, and the Tampering Rule) is unreasonable. 52 Al-
though not specifically stated, the conclusion drawn from the opin-
ion is that the Rozelle Rule makes the system unreasonable. Fur-
thermore, absent the Rozelle Rule and assuming the remaining rules
contribute to competitive balance, the system would be reason-
able. 53
The court found that the Rozelle Rule discourages a team from
50. Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 504
(E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323-26 (E.D. Pa. 1953); State v.
Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 717, 144 N.W.2d 1, 10, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990
(1966). See also Hearings on H.R. 2355 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
During these hearings Pete Rozelle stated "[tihat is what all the player controls in profes-
sional football are all about-to bring about a dispersion of the more talented players among
all of the teams so that on any given Sunday the outcome of each contest is in doubt." Id. at
51. In support of the contention that these rules achieve competitive balance, see State-
ment of Pete Rozelle, Hearings, supra note 61, wherein he pointed out that during the 1974
season exactly one-half of all the regular season games were decided by seven points or less.
Id. at _.
The Mackey court clearly adopted a minority view when it stated "the existence of the
Rozelle Rule and the other restrictive devices on players have not had any material effect on
competitive balance in the National Football League." No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 11.
52. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 10.
53. This conclusion is reached from language in the decision such as "[absent the
Rozelle Rule there would be increased movement in interstate commerce of players from one
club to another." Id. at 9.
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signing a free agent.54 Unless a team is willing to risk an unknown
compensation award, it cannot sign a free agent without an agree-
ment with the former employing club on the compensation it will
pay. This "has been an effective deterrent to clubs signing free
agents" without an agreement on compensation.5
The Rozelle Rule acts as a substantial deterrent to players becom-
ing free agents.5" The player knows the likelihood.that no other team
may be willing to sign him. The net result is that after he plays out
his option the player will either leave football or sign with the same
team. Meanwhile, he would have played that option year for only
90 percent of his original salary. "Under the Rozelle Rule each indi-
vidual player is denied the right to sell his services in a free and open
market."57 The court felt that these results outweigh any possible
justifications and therefore held the rules unreasonable.5"
Determining whether it is unreasonable for a football player to be
denied the right to sell his services in a free and open market is a
difficult task. The players point out that higher salaries would be
paid if competitive bidding was permitted.59 Since many of these
players are already receiving high rates of compensation, this effect
of the Rozelle Rule may not be unreasonable. For example, Kapp's
last contract with the New England Patriots for the 1970, 1971, and
1972 seasons provided for $600,000 in salary. It is difficult to per-
ceive an undue hardship in this and similar cases. However, the
Rozelle Rule and its related practices do not apply only to these
highly paid players, the so-called "superstars." The fact that there
are viable alternatives makes the present system unreasonable.
C. Alternatives
The court in Mackey indirectly suggested an alternative when it
criticized the fact that these rules apply to average players as well
as the "superstars." ' " Since the objective of the rules is to achieve




58. Id. at 10.
59. See Statement of Kermit Alexander, President of the NFL Players' Association,
Hearings, supra note 50 at _. The Mackey court stated "the salaries paid by each club
are lower than if competitive bidding were allowed to prevail." No. 4-72-Civil 277., at 9.
60. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 9.
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competitive balance, there is no reason why the average player
should be covered by them. If an average player leaves one team and
joins another this will neither appreciably strengthen the new team
nor weaken the old one. It would therefore seem feasible to apply
these rules only to the better players. Subjecting these players to the
restrictions would not be unfair since they are paid substantially
more for their services. The difficulty would be devising a method
of classifying the players as "average" or "better." However, this
could be done by a classification based upon the salary a player
receives. Thus, if a team wanted to retain a player's services by
means of these rules or wanted to be compensated when he played
out his option and signed with another team, it would have to pay
him at least a specified minimum amount.
Another way to retain the services of a player without the use of
the present system is to sign a multi-year contract with that player,
ensuring the continued benefit of his services.
Recent negotiated settlements in the National Hockey League
and the National Basketball Association complicate the issue of
reasonableness, rather than clarify it. In hockey, the players have
accepted a system very similar to the challenged system in the NFL.
Their collective bargaining agreement provides for an option clause
as well as compensation."
In basketball, which previously had a similar system, major re-
forms have been accepted by management. Under the current agree-
ment teams retain the rights to drafted players for only one year. If
a team is unable to sign a player it drafts, he becomes eligible for
the draft in the following year. If the team which drafts him the
following year is unable to sign him, he then becomes a free agent.
Beginning next year the option clause will be removed from all
contracts, except those of first-year players signing for only one year.
They will have a one year option clause. Compensation for signing
a player previously under contract with another team will continue
until the 1980-81 season. At that time it will be replaced by the right
of first refusal. Under this rule, a player will be free to negotiate and
obtain an offer from any team in the league when the terms of his
previous contract are satisfied. However, his previous employer will
61. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1975, at 27, col. 4.
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have the right to retain that player's services, if he is willing to
match the offer.6"
Neither of these settlements answers the issue of reasonableness.
However, the acceptance by the National Hockey League players'
association of a system similar to the NFL supports the NFL con-
tention that its system is reasonable. On the other hand, the recent
settlement in the National Basketball Association suggests a possi-
bly less restrictive alternative, an indication that the present system
in the NFL is unreasonable. There is, of course, no guarantee that
this alternative will be successful.
IV. Collective Bargaining
The .second major issue on which the NFL based its defense in
Kapp and Mackey was the collective bargaining agreement signed
by the players' association and the management council in 1970.
The NFL argued that any illegality in the challenged rules was
immunized by that agreement.63 Whether such an agreement would
"legalize" these rules is an issue which neither case resolved.
In Kapp the court ruled that at the time plaintiff signed his
contract with the New England Patriots the collective bargaining
agreement was not yet in effect. 4 In Mackey the court held that the
players' union did not accept the Rozelle Rule in the collective
bargaining agreement, and that the Rozelle Rule was never the
subject of serious, intensive arms length collective bargaining."e
In both cases the NFL claimed that by its terms the collective
bargaining agreement incorporated the challenged rules in the fol-
lowing way. The agreement states: "All players in the NFL shall
sign the Standard Player Contract . *. .. "" The Standard Player
Contract states that "[t]he Player agrees at all times to comply
with and be bound by: the Constitution and By-Laws, Rules and
Regulations of the League . "7 Since the By-Laws contain the
Rozelle Rule, the NFL argued that the collective bargaining agree-
ment included acceptance by the players of the rules they were
62. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1976, at 25, col. 6.
63. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 12-13; 390 F. Supp. at 78-79.
64. 390 F. Supp. at 85-86.
65. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 14.
66. 1970 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NFL Management Council and
the NFL Players' Association art. III, § 1.
67. National Football League Standard Player Contract § 4.
1976]
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challenging." As previously stated, the court ruled against the NFL
on this point in both cases."
However, the issue remains whether a collective bargaining agree-
ment which accepts these rules will provide a valid defense to a
claim by a player that the rules violate the antitrust laws. A resolu-
tion of this issue is important because such an agreement may even-
tually be reached in negotiations between the NFL and the players'
union."'
The importance of this issue was recognized by Justice Marshall
in his dissenting opinion in Flood v. Kuhn.7' He questioned the
limits to which labor and management can agree on rules that would
be illegal under the antitrust laws.72 Authority on this question is
split.
On the one hand, if player challenges to the contract provisions
reached during collective bargaining were successful, the process of
collective bargaining would be an exercise in futility. However, if
there is no means of challenging an agreement, the door is left open
for conspiracy between management and the players' representa-
tive. Some means of harmoniously resolving the competing policies
of the antitrust and labor laws is therefore necessary.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co." pre-
sented the issue of whether a collective bargaining agreement is
immune from attack by one of its signatories because of the labor
exemption from the antitrust laws.74 The Supreme Court held that
a collective bargaining agreement provision is exempt where it re-
lates to wages, hours, and working conditions, and its purpose is to
effectuate a beneficial policy of the union and not the employer. 5
The requirement that employers and unions bargain about wages,
hours, and working conditions weighs heavily in favor of antitrust
exemptions for agreements on these subjects.6
68. 390 F. Supp. at 84.
69. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 11; 390 F. Supp. at 85-86.
70. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
71. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
72. Id. at 295-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
74. Id. at 689. For a discussion of the labor exemption from the antitrust laws, see note
80 infra.
75. 381 U.S. at 689.
76. Id. at 689-90. The rules challenged in Kapp and Mackey are mandatory subjects of
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Justice Goldberg concurred in the result in Jewel Tea77 but was
in favor of a different test for deciding whether a collective bargain-
ing agreement should receive an antitrust exemption." He read the
majority opinion as holding that an antitrust action will lie if the
court finds the union or employer conduct in question socially or
economically objectionable even though it results from collective
bargaining.79 He disagreed with the majority and concluded that
collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining under the National Labor Relations Act should not be sub-
ject to the antitrust laws.8
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. Under the Act "to bargain collectively
is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
The Mackey court took the position that the Rozelle Rule, "being a per se violation of the
antitrust laws and otherwise violative of the antitrust laws under the Rule of Reason stan-
dard, cannot, because of its illegality, constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining as that
phrase is used in labor law." No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 12. This, of course, does not answer the
question of whether such an agreement, if it includes the Rozelle Rule, should be upheld.
77. 381 U.S. at 697-735.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 697.
80. Id. at 732. Goldberg traced the history of the labor exemption from the antitrust laws
and the application of that exemption to collective bargaining agreements. The labor exemp-
tion from the Sherman Act is found in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act. Section 6 states:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor . . . organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help...
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof ....
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
Section 20 bars federal court injunctions "in any case between an employer and employees
[ ..finvolvingi a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1970).
Cases following the enactment of the Clayton Act severely cut back on the Act's mandates.
See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), in which the Court held that
§ 6 did not confer immunity from antitrust liabilities "where ... [unions] depart from .. .
normal and legitimate objects. ... Id. at 469.
In 1939 Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970), to nullify
Duplex. See H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6-8 (1932). In United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Court stated that the underlying aim of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was to "restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated
in the Clayton Act but which was frustrated .... " Id. at 235-36. The Court also said that
"[sio long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups,
the licit and the illicit . . . are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom
or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which
the particular union activities are the means." Id. at 232. In light of this history, Goldberg
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Applying the test of the majority opinion in Jewel Tea to the
Rozelle Rule and its related practices does not result in a conclusive
resolution of the issue. The rules relate to "wages, hours and work-
ing conditions." However, it is certainly questionable whether their
purpose is to effectuate a beneficial policy of the union and not the
employer. It is difficult to envision how these practices could be
ruled per se violations of the antitrust laws and at the same time
satisfy the Jewel Tea test. Also, if Goldberg's interpretation of the
majority opinion in Jewel Tea is correct, and the court finds that
the challenged rules are socially objectionable, it can find an anti-
trust violation even though the rules were agreed to in collective
bargaining.8'
The court in Kapp adopted this reasoning in dictum wherein it
stated:82
We are of the opinion that, however broad may be the exemption from anti-
trust laws of collective bargaining agreements dealing with wages, hours and
other conditions of employment, that exemption does not and should not go
so far as to permit immunized combinations to enforce employer-employee
agreements which, being unreasonable restrictions on an employee's right to
freely seek and choose his employment, have been held illegal on grounds of
public policy long before and entirely apart from the antitrust laws.
In the Mackey case, however, the court implied that such an
agreement would be upheld. It stated "[iun neither of the two
collective bargaining sessions which resulted in collective bargain-
ing agreements was there any trade-off or quid pro quo whereby the
union agreed to the Rozelle Rule in return for other benefits." 3 The
implication is that if the Rule was a trade-off for an employer con-
cession, the NFL would have a valid defense.
Legislation introduced in the House of Representatives on Janu-
ary 29, 1975,14 by Rep. John F. Seiberling adopts the position taken
by the dictum of the Kapp case. Under his proposal, even if these
practices were agreed to by the union, they would be illegal. The bill
provides in part:85
felt that "collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under
the Labor Act is not subject to the antitrust laws." 381 U.S. at 710.
81. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
82. 390 F. Supp. at 86.
83. No. 4-72-Civil 277, at 12.
84. H.R. 2355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
85. Id. Rep. Seiberling stated that the effect of his proposal would be to ban the option
NOTES
Any provision of a contract which requires . . an individual (1) to agree to
permit the other party to the contract to control his right, upon the expiration
of that contract, to enter into a contract with any other person for the purpose
of engaging in an organized professional team sport, (2) to secure a release
from the other party to the contract before entering into or performing under
such a contract with any other person for such purpose, or (3) to perform
under that contract for an unreasonable period of time shall be unenforce-
able.
The fact that collective bargaining would not be permitted to
reach an agreement on these issues was one reason given by the
Department of Justice for its recommendation against enactment of
the bill."8
The position taken by the dictum in Kapp and the Seiberling bill
is unrealistic in that it arbitrarily rules out the possibility that an
equitable agreement that includes some restrictions on player
movement can be arrived at through collective bargaining. The dic-
tum in Kapp discourages both sides from reaching an agreement by
making such an agreement totally ineffective. It is entirely possible
that the players' association will conclude that some restrictions on
player movement are necessary in order to ensure the continued
existence of the league. As such, it may wish to accept them in
return for other compensation. The players and management should
not be discouraged from entering into such an agreement."'
V. Conclusion
The present system of player control in the NFL violates the
antitrust laws. Whether it constitutes a per se violation is an issue
clause, the anti-tampering rule, the Rozelle Rule, boycotting players who tried to change
teams, and any other rules which unreasonably limit the ability of an athlete to sell his skills
and services to any employer in the industry. Statement of John Seiberling, Hearings, supra
note 50.
86. [T]he bill could prevent a players' union, certified to collectively bargain with
a sports league, from determining that a "reserve clause" or a similar contract provi-
sion would serve the players' interest as part of a complex agreement and negotiating
for such a package with a sports league. In that circumstance, we can see no persuasive
reason for prohibiting such contract provisions.
Letter from A. Mitchell McConnell, Jr., to Hon. Peter Rodino, June 19, 1975.
87. It should be noted that the inquiry is altered when the collective bargaining
agreement is used to justify the application of these restrictive rules against a third party
competitor, e.g., a rival league. In that case the NFL would be attempting to prevent competi-
tion by means of the labor exemption. This would not and indeed should not be upheld by
the courts. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 663 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Electri-
cal Local 3, 325 U.S. 797, 809 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
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on which authority is divided. However, under the rule of reason,
the availability of less-restrictive means of accomplishing the same
results leads to the conclusion that the present system is unreason-
able and therefore illegal. A solution to the present controversy
between the players and management could be found by means of
collective bargaining. Despite the dictum in Kapp which indicates
that such an agreement would not "legalize" the challenged rules,
the better view is that it should.
The agreements between the players and management in the
National Hockey League and the National Basketball League are
important not only for their substantive arrangements but also for
the lesson they provide that negotiated settlements are possible.
The results of negotiations in hockey and basketball were com-
pletely dissimilar, leading to the conclusion that the objectives
sought by both sides were tailored to the needs of the particular
sport. Survival of professional football is in the interest of both sides
to this dispute. Agreements reached through good faith, arms-
length negotiations should be encouraged and upheld by the courts.
Donald Novick
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